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F air-lending issues have gained new
prominence over the course of the last
decade. Spurred in part by the contro-
versial findings of the now-famous
“Boston Fed Study,”1 financial institu-
tions have come under more intense scru-
tiny over compliance with fair-lending
laws, with the Department of Justice tak-
ing action in more than a dozen lending-
discrimination cases since 1990.
Although the initial focus of these inves-
tigations was primarily on whether
lenders illegally discriminate in the
course of their underwriting decisions
(that is, on relative denial rates), recent
efforts have targeted bias in the pricing
of mortgage loans.
The traditional mortgage loan origina-
tion process involves a lender with in-
house (retail) loan officers who both col-
lect the information that is used to make
the underwriting decision and negotiate
the ultimate price of the loan with the
borrower. Many mortgage lenders, how-
ever, also originate loans that are
solicited by outside independent mort-
gage brokers. Such “wholesale lending”
presents unique challenges for the
enforcement of fair-lending laws. 
In this Economic Commentary, we dis-
cuss the role of brokers in the housing-
finance market, focusing on the question
of how responsible lenders should be for
the pricing decisions of independent
mortgage brokers. Although recent in-
vestigations by the Department of Justice
appear to be based on the principle that
lenders should be completely account-
able for the actions of their brokers, we
argue that this policy may be misguided.
In contrast to a lender’s relationship with
its in-house loan officers, with wholesale
loans it is the broker and not the lender
that negotiates the price the borrower
pays on the loan. Furthermore, the rela-
tionship between the broker and the
lender is typically “arms-length,” imply-
ing that the difference between the price
charged by the broker and the wholesale
price is not in any way controlled or
influenced by the lender. Therefore, we
question whether a lender should be held
accountable for patterns that may
emerge in the prices brokers negotiate
with borrowers. Further, we are skeptical
that one can conduct an adequate statisti-
cal evaluation of broker pricing practices
using only data obtained from a single
lender, in part because the typical broker
deals with multiple lenders. As a result,
we believe it is unreasonable to hold the
lender accountable for the pricing deci-
sions of its brokers. Instead, we argue
that fair-lending investigations into the
pricing of brokered loans should be tar-
geted at the root source of any discrimi-
natory behavior: the brokers themselves.
n n An Overview 
of Mortgage Pricing
In order to investigate an institution’s
pricing decisions, regulators must first
confront the question of how to measure
the mortgage’s “price.” As was argued in
a previous Economic Commentary, the
proper tool for conducting such investi-
gations is through statistical compar-
isons of “overages” paid by different
groups.2  Essentially, an overage is cal-
culated by comparing the up-front fee
(the number of “points”) a borrower
actually pays on a loan with that listed
on the lender’s rate sheet on the day the
borrower’s interest rate is locked (the
“required price”).3  This comparison
would take into account regional loca-
tion, the length of the borrower’s rate
lock, the size of the loan, and any other
elements according to which prices may
be arrayed on the rate sheet.
To evaluate an institution’s compliance
with fair-lending laws, examiners calcu-
late the overage charged each borrower
and then compare the frequency and
magnitude of overages charged to
minorities with those charged to simi-
larly situated white borrowers.4  Raw
differences in pricing across racial
groups would not constitute evidence of
illegal discrimination in and of them-
selves. Rather, these differences must
remain statistically significant even after
controlling for other factors that might
reasonably affect loan prices. (See box.)
When a loan is originated through a
broker, the process of calculating an
overage is essentially the same. As with
their direct loans, wholesale lenders
provide brokers with a rate sheet listing
the prices at which they are willing to
underwrite loans during a given time
period, and they generally have a stan-
dard set of origination fees they charge
on brokered loans.
However, there are important differences
between brokered and direct lending that
make testing for discriminatory lending
patterns in brokered lending a funda-
mentally distinct exercise. First, in bro-
kered lending, the actual origination and
discount points charged, as well as the
May 15, 1999
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Mortgage Brokers and Fair Lending
by Stanley D. Longhofer and Paul S. Calem
Mortgage brokers play an important
role in the housing-finance market,
but they also present unique chal-
lenges to regulators attempting to en-
force fair-lending laws.  Should lend-
ers be held responsible for the pricing
decisions of brokers from whom they
receive loan applications, or should
fair-lending laws instead be applied
directly to the brokers themselves?
ISSN 0428-1276nominal interest rate, are set via nego-
tiations between the borrower and the
broker, not the wholesale lender that
underwrites the loan. Second, in most
cases the broker is able to keep any ex-
cess points that it is able to charge a bor-
rower over that required by the lender’s
rate sheet. In other words, the broker is
the full beneficiary of any overage paid
by the borrower—the lender does not
share in the overage. Third, brokers gen-
erally are not bound by exclusivity
agreements with lenders. The typical
broker deals with several different
lenders simultaneously, selling each loan
to the lender that offers the best price on
any given day. As we shall see, these
features of wholesale lending have im-
portant implications for the interpreta-
tion of brokered-loan pricing patterns in
data from an individual lender.
n n One Lender’s Story
Consider the case of Acme Mortgage
Company, a hypothetical mortgage bank
that works with a large number of bro-
kers to solicit business. Suppose that in
their analysis of Acme’s brokered lend-
ing portfolio, bank examiners find that
black borrowers pay overages more fre-
quently, resulting in a pricing disparity
of 1.5 points between white and black
borrowers, even after controlling for
other borrower and loan characteristics
that might legitimately and legally influ-
ence the prices of these loans. In com-
mon parlance, this disparity means that
the “typical” minority borrower paid
$1,500 dollars more in up-front fees on a
$100,000 loan than did an identical
white borrower for a loan with exactly
the same terms.
If such a disparity existed within Acme’s
direct lending portfolio (among those
loans processed by Acme’s own loan offi-
cers), it would be strong preliminary evi-
dence of illegal discrimination by Acme,
and the regulatory agency would investi-
gate further and possibly refer the case to
the Department of Justice.5 There are a
number of reasons, however, why a refer-
ral may be inappropriate with regard to an
institution’s wholesale portfolio (those
loans processed by outside brokers).
n n Cross-Broker Disparities
It is important to note that pricing dispar-
ities within Acme’s wholesale portfolio
can arise in two distinct ways: either
“across” or “within” individual brokers.
“Cross-broker disparities” result when
minority borrowers tend to apply at bro-
kers that charge higher fees, while white
borrowers tend to apply at brokers that
charge lower fees; despite this difference
in pricing across brokers, however, no
individual broker actually treats its own
minority and white customers differently.
In order to hold lenders accountable for
cross-broker disparities, regulators
would need to prove that the cause of the
disparity was differential treatment of
borrowers based on their race, and not
cost or other legitimate factors. This
would be very difficult. Indeed, there are
many conceivable reasons why individ-
ual brokers might charge more or less
for their services than other brokers and
why some brokers specialize in lending
to a particular segment of their commu-
nity. For example, a cross-broker dispar-
ity might be observed if higher-fee bro-
kers provide a fuller array of services,
such as spending more time with cus-
tomers, and minority borrowers tend to
prefer these brokers. As a result, we
argue that regulators should not view
cross-broker disparities on their own as
evidence of illegal discrimination. 
n n Within-Broker Disparities
Alternatively, “within-broker dispari-
ties” arise when white and minority cus-
tomers of the same broker are treated
differently. Within-broker disparities can
give rise to an overall pricing disparity
in Acme’s portfolio in either of two
ways: if such disparities are pervasive
across many different brokers with
whom Acme does business; or if a single
broker with such a disparity supplies a
large proportion of Acme’s loans.
Although within-broker disparities are,
on the surface, more suspect than cross-
broker disparities, in practice it can be
quite difficult to reliably interpret
whether they are truly the result of ille-
gal behavior. Proper evaluation requires
separately examining the data from each
individual broker for evidence that a
particular broker is engaged in discrimi-
natory practices. Separate statistical
tests should be conducted because dif-
ferent brokers generally are subject to
different economic factors affecting
their pricing patterns. Evaluating each
broker individually, however, entails
two types of difficulties.
First, for any given lender, the number of
loans originated via any one broker is
often too small to permit a meaningful
statistical analysis. Such an analysis re-
quires controlling for various factors that
are likely to affect the broker’s propensity
to seek an overage, which in turn requires
a large sample of observations.6
More importantly, because an individual
broker typically deals with multiple
lenders, the loans the broker sends to any
one lender may not be representative of
the broker’s overall activity. The loans
sent to that lender may happen to include
a disproportionate number originated to
minority borrowers and from which the
broker obtained an overage. Thus, while
the data from a given lender may indi-
cate a within-broker disparity, the bro-
ker’s total activity may show no evi-
dence of discrimination.
n n Should Lenders Be Liable 
for Their Brokers?
Even if regulators could reliably identify
discrimination arising from cross- or
within-broker disparities, the fundamen-
tal policy question remains as to whether
Acme should be held accountable for the
behavior of its brokers. We argue not. As
noted above, broker agreements gener-
ally do not require the broker to work
exclusively with any one bank, nor do
they require a certain number of loans to
be presented. Instead, they usually repre-
sent quintessential arms-length transac-
tions.7  The broker solicits potential bor-
rowers, collects and verifies the
information on their applications, and
forwards the completed applications to
the lender offering the best price on any
given day. Pricing of these loans is the
result of negotiations between borrowers
and the broker. Indeed, the borrower and
the broker may agree upon a price long
before the ultimate lender is even cho-
sen.8  In any event, the lender typically is
not a party to this decision, and receives
no portion of any overage obtained by
the broker. Given these facts, it seems
hard to justify holding Acme responsible
for a pricing decision in which it had lit-
tle or no input.9
Indeed, the relationship between the bro-
ker and Acme is substantively no differ-
ent than that between a lender and Fan-
nie Mae or Freddie Mac, the two major
secondary-market institutions that are
credited with making mortgage loans
substantially more affordable for con-
sumers.10  When lenders prepare their
rate sheets, they do so based on esti-
mates of the prices at which various
loans will sell in the secondary market
weeks in the future. They then allow
borrowers to lock in an interest rate well
in advance of the actual funding date. Of
course, once the loan is actually funded,the actual price at which it will trade on
the secondary market may be vastly dif-
ferent from that anticipated when the
rate was locked. If loans are trading at a
premium, the lender pockets the differ-
ence; if they are trading at a discount, the
lender must eat the loss.11 In either case,
the borrower is helped by the fact that
the rate can be locked in advance, effec-
tively providing insurance against inter-
est rate volatility. 
This is essentially the same service that
brokers provide to borrowers. The bro-
ker is an intermediary between the lender
and the borrower in the same way that
the lender is an intermediary between the
borrower and the secondary market.
Because brokers are in constant contact
with lenders, they may be able to obtain
better prices than borrowers could by
contacting the lenders directly. If lenders
were to be held liable for the pricing
decisions of individual brokers, direct
application of the same logic would sug-
gest that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
should be liable for the pricing decisions
of anyone who sells loans to them, a pol-
icy that few are proposing. 
n n What Should We Do?
Given the difficulty of evaluating
lenders’ wholesale loan portfolios for
evidence of pricing discrimination, how
are regulators to proceed? Clearly, bro-
kered lending should not be exempt from
fair-lending laws. This is an important
and growing part of the housing-finance
market, and basic fairness requires that
all market participants be subject to the
same rules and regulations. Nevertheless,
the need for some kind of enforcement
does not justify the use of methods that
can be both unreliable and misleading.
We contend that fair-lending laws should
be applied directly to brokers, not indi-
rectly through the lenders they work
with. The only way to determine
whether a broker discriminates is by
looking at all of that broker’s pricing
decisions, not just those loans that were
funded by one particular lender or
another. Only by observing the entire
universe of a broker’s loans can we
begin to make a determination of
whether a pattern of illegal discrimina-
tion exists. 
Why is this not the current state of
affairs? Most likely, the answer is histor-
ical accident. Depository institutions and
their subsidiaries are already subject to
regular examinations to verify their
compliance with a host of consumer reg-
ulations. In contrast, independent mort-
gage brokers are not subject to regular
examinations.12
Nevertheless, the most effective and
accurate way of enforcing these laws is
to evaluate mortgage brokers directly.
Just as we do not hold Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac liable for the pricing deci-
sions of the mortgage banks that sell
them loans, neither should we hold
lenders responsible for pricing decisions
that are wholly out of their control. 
n n Footnotes
1. Alicia H. Munnell, Lynn E. Browne,
James McEneaney, and Geoffrey M.B.
Tootell. “Mortgage Lending in Boston: Inter-
preting HMDA Data.” Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, October
1992. This paper was later revised and pub-
lished in the American Economic Review, vol.
86, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 25–53.
2.  See Stanley D. Longhofer, “Measuring
Pricing Bias in Mortgages,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary,
August 1, 1998. 
3.  The rate sheet indicates the number of dis-
count points required by a lender to fund
loans with various nominal interest rates. For
an example of a rate sheet, see Stanley D.
Longhofer, “Measuring Pricing Bias in Mort-
gages,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Commentary, August 1, 1998. 
4.  For expositional convenience, we discuss
only racial disparities in this article. Of
course, disparities across other protected char-
acteristics such as age, gender, or marital sta-
tus are illegal as well, and are considered by
examiners in their fair-lending investigations.
5.  By law, if the Federal Reserve or other
bank regulator uncovers substantial evidence
that discrimination may have occurred, it is
required to pass this information on to the
Department of Justice for further investiga-
tion. Note that a referral to Justice does not
constitute a conclusion of discrimination,
merely that further investigation is warranted. 
6.  These are generally the same as the factors
that influence a lender’s propensity to seek an
overage with a retail loan. For example, bro-
kers typically are paid a fixed percentage of
the loan amount by the lender as compensa-
tion for originating the loan, and, therefore,
they have greater incentive to seek additional
compensation (in the form of an overage) on
smaller loans. 
TESTING FOR PRICING BIAS
When regulators test for compliance with fair-lending laws, they typically conduct statis-
tical analyses to see whether lenders systematically charge minority borrowers a higher
price than they do whites. In doing so, they control for other factors that may affect the
pricing of mortgage loans, many of which are correlated with race. For example:
• Negotiation Skills – Older, better educated, and more experienced borrowers may be
more skilled at negotiating the terms of their loans.
• Credit History – Borrowers with poor credit histories may not deal for lower fees
because they have fewer alternative sources of credit, and originators may seek higher
fees to compensate for the extra time and effort such borrowers may entail.
• Willingness to Shop – Some borrowers may place a high premium on their time (for
example, high-income borrowers) and choose not to shop for the best rate. 
• Market Conditions – The competitiveness of the loan market may vary over the
course of the year.
• Length of Rate Lock – Borrowers who let their rate float may be more susceptible to
overaging at the time of closing; on the other hand, such borrowers may be more sophis-
ticated and less prone to being overaged.
• Loan Size – Many of the costs associated with originating a mortgage do not vary with
the size of the loan, giving originators a stronger incentive to overage borrowers with
small loan amounts. 
• Type of Loan – Cost differences across different loan products (conventional vs. gov-
ernment insured, home purchase vs. refinancing) may result from regulatory and market
factors independent of the borrower’s characteristics. 
Fair-lending analyses attempt to control for these and other factors to isolate the effects
of race on the pricing decision. 7. Some broker agreements tie the broker
much more closely to the lender, with some
brokers acting little differently than a lender’s
in-house loan officers. Obviously, the degree
to which the lender should be held responsi-
ble for the broker’s behavior should depend
on the amount of freedom the broker has to
act independently of the lending institution. 
8. This fact suggests that the very notion of
an overage is less meaningful in the context
of the brokered lending relationship. That is,
the proper measure of pricing bias would
compare the points paid by the borrower with
those required by the broker on the day the
borrower’s loan terms are set. 
9.  Some might argue that lenders, if they so
desired, could act to influence the prices
charged by the brokers with whom they deal
(for example, by placing restrictions on the
spread between the wholesale price and the
price paid by the borrower), and that lenders
should therefore be held accountable for 
broker pricing behavior. Such restrictions,
however, would likely reduce brokers’ abili-
ties to obtain the best rates for borrowers,
either by reducing competition among bro-
kers or by constraining their ability to shop
among lenders.
10. The secondary-mortgage market com-
prises a wide variety of investors who pur-
chase pools of mortgage loans in order to
receive the principal and interest payments
they generate. Participants include depository
institutions, institutional investors such as
insurance companies and pension funds, and
wealthy individuals. The primary difference
distinguishing the relationships between bro-
ker and lender and that of lender and the sec-
ondary market is that brokers rarely fund
loans and hold them on their own books prior
to delivering them to a lender, whereas mort-
gage banks generally do hold loans for a
short time before selling them on the sec-
ondary market.
11. Lenders do, of course, hedge these risks
using a variety of tools.
12.  Technically, enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act with respect to mortgage brokers
falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission, but this agency does 
not conduct regular examinations of these
brokers.
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